Human factors certification criteria are being developed for large civil aircraft with the objective of reducing the incidence of design-induced error on the flight deck.
The roots of human error are manifold and have complex interrelationships with all aspects of the operation of a modern airliner. However, during the last decade 'design induced' error has become of particular concern to the airworthiness authorities, particularly in the highly automated third (and fourth) generations of automated airliners. However, Chapanis 3 noted that that back in the 1940's many aspects of 'pilot error' were really 'designer error'. This was a challenge to contemporary thinking at the time and shows that good design is all-important in human error reduction. He was particularly interested in why pilots often retracted the landing gear instead of the landing flaps after landing the aircraft. He identified the problem as 'designer error' rather than 'pilot error', as the designer had put two identical toggle switches side-by-side, one for the gear and the other for the flaps. It was proposed that the controls were separated and coded. The separation and coding of controls is now standard human factors practice. Half a century after Chapanis's original observations, the idea that one can design error-tolerant devices is beginning to gain credence 4 . The high levels of automation in the new generation airliners have without a doubt offered considerable advances in safety over their forbearers, however new types of error have begun to emerge on these flight decks 5 . This was exemplified by accidents such as the Nagoya Airbus A300-600 (where the pilots could not disengage the go-around mode after inadvertent activation as a result of a combination of lack of understanding of the automation and poor design of the operating logic in the autoland system); the Cali Boeing 757 accident (where the poor interface on the flight management computer and a lack of logic checking resulted in a CFIT accident); and the Strasbourg A320 accident (where the crew inadvertently set an excessive rate of descent instead of manipulating the flight path angle as a result of both functions utilising a common control interface and an associated poor display).
As a result of such accidents, the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
commissioned an exhaustive study of the pilot-aircraft interface on modern flight decks 6 . The report identified several major flight deck design shortcomings and deficiencies in the design process. There were criticisms of the flight deck interfaces, such as pilots' autoflight mode awareness/indication; energy awareness; confusing and unclear display symbology and nomenclature, and a lack of consistency in FMS interfaces and conventions. The report also heavily criticised the flight deck design process, identifying in particular a lack of human factors expertise on design teams and placing too much emphasis on the physical ergonomics of the flight deck, and insufficient on the cognitive ergonomics. Fifty-one specific recommendations came out of the report, including: Compliance with any airworthiness requirement must be established through inspection, demonstration, evaluation, analysis and/or test. To demonstrate compliance with the forthcoming human factors airworthiness requirements, formal error analysis will be one of the most rigorous ways of evaluating the pilot interface and demonstrating that the likelihood of 'design-induced error' is as low as is reasonably practicable. Formal error analysis is not new; however it is a novel approach as a means of demonstrating compliance with a certification requirement.
Any technique used for a formal approval process must be reliable, valid and, for the purposes of certification, the method should also be capable of being used by nonhuman factors experts within the certification authorities (e.g. the certification test pilots). As a direct corollary, any such technique should also be capable of being used by the flight deck design teams to verify in the early stages of design that their flight deck interfaces are likely to comply with the certification requirement. In addition to enhancing safety, there is also a strong economic argument for the early identification of inadequacies in the pilot interface. It has been suggested that there is a 1:10:100 ratio in the cost to correct interface adequacies at the design, development and operational stages, respectively 13 .
Any error prediction methodology for the flight deck must be designed to encompass the specific demands of the aviation environment. However, there is some caution and scepticism in the aerospace industry with regard to formal methods that produce a probability of error associated with any aspect of crew performance.
Advisory Circular AC25.1309-1A 14 also suggests that the reliable quantitative estimation of the probability of crew error is not possible. As a result, emphasis is placed upon the identification of potential errors using formal methods, not their quantification.
This paper describes the development, testing and comparative benchmarking of a new human error identification (HEI) technique, the Human Error Template (HET).
HET has been developed specifically for the aerospace industry as a diagnostic tool intended as an aid for the early identification of design induced errors, and as a formal method to demonstrate the inclusion of human factors issues in the design and certification process of aircraft flight decks, including amended and supplemental type certification.
Description of the HET methodology
HET is a checklist style approach to error prediction that comes in the form of an error proforma containing twelve error modes. Second, for each credible error the analyst provides a description of the form that the error would take. Third, the analyst has to determine the outcome or consequence associated with the error. Finally, the analyst estimates the likelihood of the error (low, medium or high) and the criticality of the error (low, medium or high). If the error is given a high rating for both likelihood and criticality, the aspect of the interface involved in the task step is then rated as a 'fail', meaning that it is not suitable for certification. The main advantages of the HET method are that it is simple to learn and use, requiring very little training and it is also designed to be a very quick method to use. The error taxonomy used is comprehensive as it is based on existing error taxonomies from a large number of HEI methods. The HET method is also easily auditable as it comes in the form of an error proforma. An example of a HET output is shown in Figure 2 . An extract of the corresponding HTA upon which it is based can be found in Figure 3 . A full description of the methodology can be found elsewhere
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Benchmarking HET methodology against existing HEI methods
A short list of 32 prospective HEI methods for subsequent evaluation of their suitability for flight deck design and certification was compiled 16 . These methods were then further analysed under 10 broad headings to aid down-selection. The 10 headings were:
1. What the method measures -error, performance times, mental workload etc.
2. Which domain the method was originally developed for -nuclear power, aviation, HCI etc. the analyst provides a description of the form that the error would take. Next, the analyst has to determine any consequences associated with the error and any future task steps that might lead to recovery from the error. An ordinal probability of the error occurring is assigned (low, medium or high), together with criticality of the error (low, medium or high) and any potential design remedies (i.e. how the interface design could be modified to eradicate the error) are recorded.
comprehensive approach to error prediction, gives an exhaustive and detailed analysis of potential errors and also the SHERPA error taxonomy prompts the analyst for any potential errors. Furthermore, a number of studies have shown encouraging validity and reliability data for the SHERPA technique.
In a comparative study of six human error identification techniques 20 SHERPA achieved the highest overall rankings on a number of assessment criteria for its performance (comprehensiveness, accuracy, consistency, theoretical validity, usefulness and acceptability). In a further study 21 the method also performed well in predicting subsequent actual errors. Empirical studies have shown that SHERPA has acceptable test/re-test reliability 22, 23 and has performed reasonably well in an aviation environment 23 . However, SHERPA's main weaknesses are that it is both tedious and time consuming to perform and it does not consider the cognitive components of the error mechanisms. The method's consistency when used by different analysts can also be questioned.
Human Error Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)
HAZOP is a well-established engineering approach that developed in the late 1960s 24 for use in process design audit and engineering risk assessment 25 . Originally applied to engineering diagrams the HAZOP technique involves the analyst applying guidewords (e.g. 'Not done'; 'More than' or 'Later than') to each step in a process to identify potential problems. A more human factors orientated version emerged in the form of the Human Error HAZOP, aimed at dealing with human error issues 24 .
Whalley 18 created a new set of guidewords, more applicable to human error. These are applied to each step in an HTA to determine any credible errors (i.e. those judged by the subject matter expert to be possible). Once the analyst has recorded a description of the error, the consequences, cause and recovery path of it are also recorded. Finally, the analyst then records any design improvements to remedy the error.
HAZOP has been used emphatically in many domains. HAZOP style techniques have received wide acceptance by both the process industries and the regulatory authorities 27 . Human Error HAZOP is relatively quick, easy to use and an exhaustive technique. However, similar to the SHERPA, its main weaknesses are that it is time consuming and also that some of the errors predicted using the tool are questionable.
HEIST -Human Error Identification in Systems Tool
HEIST 17 is a technique that has similarities to a number of traditional HEI techniques (e.g. SHERPA). HEIST can be used by the analyst to identify external error modes by using tables that contain various error prompt questions. There are eight tables in total, under the headings of Activation/Detection; Observation/Data collection;
Identification of system state; Interpretation; Evaluation; Goal selection/Task definition; Procedure selection and Procedure execution. The analyst applies each table to each task step from an HTA and determines whether any errors are credible.
For each credible error, the analyst then records the system cause or psychological error mechanism and error reduction guidelines (which are all provided in the HEIST tables) and also the error consequence.
the analyst for potential errors. However, the method suffers from a number of domain transfer problems due to the fact that it was developed for the nuclear power industry. HEIST error identifier prompts and error reduction guidelines are quite process control specific, pertaining mostly the nuclear power industry. Herein lies the catch in developing a reliable and valid predictive error technique. If the error identifiers do not key onto the tasks in any meaningful way it is difficult to generate credible errors for any given situation. The more domain appropriate the error identifier prompts and error reduction guidelines, the less generalisable the technique becomes. Generic error identifiers can be applied across domains but are unlikely to perform as well those using a domain as a specific taxonomy. Conversely, domain specific prompts and guidelines are likely to be successful in that domain but are unlikely to perform well across domains. Indeed, as the HET error taxonomy has been developed exclusively for flight decks, similar to HEIST, it also is unlikely to work well in other domains. Furthermore, HEIST can also be time consuming to perform.
Empirical benchmarking study
The benchmarking study progressed in three stages. Firstly, the HET HEI technique, together with the SHERPA, human HAZOP and HEIST methodologies were applied to the task of conducting an approach and landing in a modern, highly automated, glass cockpit commercial airliner (Aircraft X). This produced predictions of the errors likely to occur. This was done by the same analysts on two occasions approximately one month apart. Secondly (using an independent research team) using a questionnaire, low-level error data were collected from flight crew currently flying Aircraft X concerning the errors that they had made during the approach and landing flight phase. Kirwan 28 noted that a fundamental problem when validating formal error identification techniques is obtaining ecologically-valid and reliable criterion data. Accidents are very infrequent events and investigation reports do not contain sufficient detail to establish the design-induced errors that contributed to the sequence of events. Incident data are more abundant, however, these reports contain even fewer details about the pilots' actions and any potential shortcomings on the flight deck which potentially provoked design-induced errors. As a result, a self-completion questionnaire had to be used for this task. Finally, once the above two data collection stages were completed, the final stage was to compare the error data with the predictions made by the four different techniques using a signal detection paradigm to assess the predictive validity of the method, 29,30 .
Stage One: HEI Predictions using HET, SHERPA, human HAZOP and HEIST
An HTA of a fully-coupled autoland approach to New Orleans airport undertaken in Aircraft X was performed. This consisted of some 22 subtasks under the main headings of setting up for approach, lining up for the runway, and preparing the aircraft for landing. The approach and landing considered was completely normal with no non-routine procedures included. This task analysis formed the basis of the following formal error prediction analysis. An extract of this HTA for illustrative purposes is included in figure 3 . The full HTA can be found elsewhereThirty-seven graduate engineering participants were trained in one of the HEI methods (eight trained in HET; nine in SHERPA and human HAZOP and 11 trained in HEIST). No participants had any prior experience of either civil aviation or HEI techniques. When the instructors were satisfied that the training was completed, the main task was introduced. This required participants to make predictions of the errors that pilots could make in the autoland task.
To make their predictions, participants were given an HTA of the autoland task developed by the authors (described previously); a demonstration of performing an autoland using Microsoft flight simulator; the relevant HEI taxonomies; and colour photographs of Aircraft X's Flight Control Unit, flap levers, landing gear lever, speed brake, primary flight displays, and an overview of the flight deck.
Participants were required to make predictions of the pilot errors on two separate occasions, separated by a period of four weeks. This enabled intra-analyst reliability statistics to be computed. The predictions made were compared with error data reported by pilots using autoland (as described in the following section).
Stage 2: Collection of error data
From the approach and landing HTA for Aircraft X a list was compiled of all the possible errors that could be made during the landing phase of flight using the Flight Control Unit (FCU) as the main controlling interface. Several additional system interfaces were also included such as the speed brake and flaps. A further supplementary list of potential errors was developed from observations made during a series of orientation flights on Aircraft X and comments from interviews with type rated pilots. These data were used to develop a design induced error questionnaire specific to Aircraft X.
The questionnaire was designed to elicit a comprehensive picture of the low-level errors pilots recalled making on the flight deck while flying a fully-coupled autoland approach and landing when flying Aircraft X. To achieve this, respondents were not only asked if they had ever made the error themselves but also if they knew of a fellow pilot who had made the same error. A simple 'yes/no' response format was used. As it was highly probable that the list of questions was not exhaustive, space was provided to report additional errors or for further comments to be given.
Following a pilot administration of the instrument to a sample of senior pilots to check for errors and to refine the wording of the survey items, the final questionnaire was sent to pilots flying the aircraft in three UK Airlines. and other miscellaneous items (13 questions). On return of the questionnaires, several additional interviews were conducted to clarify the additional comments received on many survey instruments.
Stage 3: Comparison of error data with HEI predictions 4.3.1 Error data sample
Forty-six pilots responded to the survey. Captains comprised 45.7% of the sample;
First Officers 37% of the sample and the remainder were either Training Captains (13.3%) or failed to state their position (two respondents). Experience ranged from less than 2,000 hours to over 16,000 with a mean of 6,832 hours (standard deviation of 4,524 hours). Type specific experience ranged from less than 1,000 hours to over 5,000 hours (mean 1,185 hours; standard deviation 1,360 hours).
Error data
Fifty-seven different types of error were reported, either as responses to the structured survey items or in the additional comments section of the questionnaire. contains the percentage of respondents who had made the error in question themselves; the column labelled 'OTHER' contains the data indicating that they had seen someone else make the error.
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Analysis
The predictions made by each of the HEI techniques were compared with error data collected. This enabled validity statistics to be computed using a signal detection paradigm 29, 30 . This approach has provided a framework for testing the power of formal human error identification methods 22, 29 . In addition to comparing correct predictions of error with actual errors (hits) it identifies type I analytical errors (a miss: when the error analyst predicts the error will not occur and it does) and type II analytical errors (a false alarm: when the error analyst predicts that there will be an error and there is not). This is described in Figure 4 . The signal detection paradigm can be used to calculate the sensitivity index (SI). This provides a value between 0 and 1, the closer that SI is to 1, the more accurate the technique's predictions are. The formula used to calculate SI is given in equation 1, taken from Stanton and alarm scores were statistically significantly higher on the second application.
Discussion
General Discussion
The objective of this study was to demonstrate the utility of the newly developed HET methodology for predicting potential design induced pilot error on a landing task and compare the technique's performance against three contemporary HEI methods (SHERPA, Human Error HAZOP and HEIST). The study also aimed to demonstrate that participant SI scores, hit rates and false alarm rates would improve significantly when the analysts performed the same analysis for a second time.
In terms of accuracy of error predictions, participants using the HET methodology were the most accurate in their error predictions for the flight task analysed. Of the other three methods, SHERPA, Human Error HAZOP and HEIST, there were no statistically significant differences between the accuracy of the error predictions made. It should be reiterated that the HET error mode taxonomy was developed from actual pilot error incidences and from an exhaustive analysis of contemporary error prediction, which should make it the most appropriate technique for use on civil flight decks. The other HEI methods (SHERPA, Human Error HAZOP and HEIST) suffer in that they utilise error mode taxonomies developed specifically for tasks undertaken in nuclear power plant control rooms. The performance of the four HEI methods is largely due to the constraints imposed on the possible errors that can be predicted by the error mode taxonomies they employ. The possible errors that can be predicted by each method are determined by HET's error mode checklist, SHERPA's behaviour and error mode taxonomy, Human Error HAZOP's guidewords and by HEIST's error identifier questions. For example, the guidewords used in the Human Error HAZOP methodology do not allow the analyst to predict an error such as, 'Pilot enters airspeed using the heading knob instead of the speed/Mach knob' (one of the more frequent errors reported by pilots -see Table 1 ). The HET checklist error taxonomy, however, prompts the analyst for this error, with the error mode 'Task executed on wrong interface element' (see Figure 2 ).
The HET methodology is simple to learn and use. Participants using HET were able to pick the method up easier than participants using the other three methods. It expected that the SI scores would improve between the first and second application of the method, however the results demonstrated that there was no statistically significant difference between the participant scores. Further analysis of the results revealed that although hit rate scores were found to significantly increase on the second application of the methods (i.e. participants were predicting more hits and less misses) it was also found that false alarm rate scores also increased significantly (participants were predicting more false alarms and making less correct rejections).
As a result of this, the SI scores did not improve significantly on the second application of the method. Analysts were improving at predicting more of the actual errors reported by the pilots (hits) but also predicting significantly more errors that
were not reported by the pilots (false alarms), thus making less correct rejections.
There is an alternative view, though, that a false alarm is an error waiting to happen.
As a result it would be imprudent to dismiss the possibility of such an error ever occurring simply because it has not yet happened.
As a slight caveat, it can be argued that it is perhaps a little difficult for analysts with little or no experience of the task to make definitive judgements on the probability of an error or its ultimate criticality. Further work is required to establish the reliability and sensitivity of the HET methodology when used by certification Test
Pilots and Experienced Design Engineers. It should also be noted that at the moment the methodology does not encompass the potential error detection/error mitigation processes afforded when flying on a multi-crew flight deck. However, as it is a requirement that for certification purposes all aircraft are capable of operation by a single pilot without imposing undue workload, this was not regarded as a high priority item in the development of HET.
Following comments from subject matter experts on the HET methodology several slight revisions are envisaged for the next version of the technique, including formally including some estimate of the subsequent detection of an error on the recording form ( figure 2 ) and a method of prompting analysts to comment specifically on the ergonomic inadequacies in the pilot interface that promoted any predicted errors.
At the present time it is unlikely that human probabilistic risk assessments can meet the requirements of the aircraft certification process, as noted by the FAA 14 .
However, the present results indicate that existing human error identification techniques (SHERPA, human error HAZOP and HEIST) developed for use in other domains (e.g. nuclear power, petrochemical, manufacturing and process industries)
can be applied with some success in an aviation context. The HET technique, though,
shows even higher criterion-referenced validity than these and it can be concluded that with a little further development it should provide a useful diagnostic tool as an adjunct to the proposed human factors certification process 7-12 .
Conclusions
This paper demonstrates that HET can be applied as a flight deck design evaluation tool, although it is acknowledged that the initial HTA may be time consuming.
Ideally, the analyst applying HET should have some knowledge of the skills and procedures required to fly an aeroplane (although that was not the case in this studynone of the analysts has any formal aviation knowledge), or at least experience of the systems used on the flight deck. However, it is likely that with only moderate training, certification test pilots could achieve even higher validity coefficients than those reported in this paper. SI T1  SI T2  HR T1  HR T2  FA T1  FA T2 HET SHERPA HAZOP HEIST 
